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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, the United States Supreme Court's Equal
Protection jurisprudence has deepened the disjunction between the
fundamental values embedded in the Constitution and the realities of three
centuries of collective racial experience.The purposeful discrinination rule,
first announced in Washington v. Davis,' has created an impenetrable brick
wall for today's plaintiff because it assumes that the most egregious
institutional and social forms of discrimination have been overcome.
* Associate at Davis Polk & Wardwell. B.A. 1996, University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign; M.PP 1999,John E Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University;J.D.
2002,Yale Law School.
I would like to especially thank Professor Kenji Yoshino not only for his academic
supervision but for the benefit of his wisdom, insights and support. I would also like to
thank Professor Rob Harrison, Professor Mahzarin Banaji, and Josh Liston for their invalu-
able comments and criticisms.
1. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Despite the growing acceptance by the courts of the existence of
"unconscious racism," some proof of legislators' racial animus or their
discriminatory intent must be demonstrated for liability under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The evidentiary
requirements to establish the subjective state of mind of legislators are so
stringent that they allow governing bodies to adopt numerous measures
that harm minorities. While the existing doctrine undercuts the
Constitution's prohibition on racial discrimination, it also allows
legislators to practice purposeful discrimination quite easily because the
doctrine scrutinizes mostly voluntary self-incrimination.
This Article argues that the Court will not fulfill the promise of the
Equal Protection Clause unless the Court adapts its vision of anti-
discrimination to account for the complex nature of discrimination.
Imagine that we could measure unconscious discrimination. If so, then we
could broaden the concept of purposeful discrimination to include the
measurement of a legislator's reliance on unconscious racial stereotypes.
Such a measuring device may already exist: The Implicit Association Test
(IAT), a computer-based test developed by Yale and University of Wash-
ington psychologists. Researchers do not yet know how well the IAT can
uncover racial stereotypes; however, if the IAT could discern the state of
mind of decision-makers, it could enable all acts of race-dependent deci-
sion-making to be subject to pre-scrutiny analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause. Currently, facially race-neutral statutes are practically
impervious to constitutional challenges by aggrieved plaintiffs, because
discriminatory intent often cannot be "located" by the Court. This barrier
has continued to shield legislators from judicial scrutiny. The IAT could
"smoke out" illegitimate purposes by demonstrating that the classification
does not in fact serve its stated purpose.
Part I of this Article surveys the doctrinal history of the intent stan-
dard in anti-discrimination law. It offers critiques by two scholars who
argue that the Court in Davis created a dichotomous vision of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence-either the racial discrimination was a product of
invidious, malicious intent or the perpetrator was entirely blameless.
However, several lower federal courts, and even members of the Supreme
Court, have acknowledged the existence of unconscious racism in their
analyses of equal protection challenges. 2 Additionally, this Part briefly
2. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (stat-
ing that unconscious racism on the part of prosecutors may have equal protection
consequences in peremptory challenges); see also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 328-35
(1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (finding that unconscious racism, combined with statistical
evidence, demonstrated racial disparity in the imposition of Georgia's death penalty stat-
ute); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that
unconscious racism may influence prosecutors when they make race-based peremptory
challenges).
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highlights how psychological testing, at least in theory, could address the
Court's concern for institutional competence and could demystify its
skepticism that unconscious racism can actually be measured.
Part II introduces the Implicit Association Test, highlighting the
benefits the test offers, such as its ability to unmask prejudice and even
reduce the prejudice of test-takers. In addition, this part juxtaposes the
IAT with other tests, arguing that the IAT is just as credible as other tests
upon which social actors, including courts, routinely rely. Further, this Part
acknowledges that courts may not allow litigants to rely on the IAT unless
the test can meet the reliability standards that courts require of other evi-
dentiary tools.
Part III examines how the IAT fits neatly within the existing equal
protection framework to infer intent. This Part offers a minimal
refinement of the Davis intent standard: use of the IAT within the
evidentiary factors identified in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Authority.3 Plaintiffs could use the IAT to discern
motive when the record seems to indicate no animus on the part of the
decision-maker but the policy choice has a racially disparate impact.This
limited use of the IAT will preserve the autonomy of legislative action
and minimize judicial interference. Further, this Part suggests how the
IAT could be useful in other areas of law and policy such as jury
selection, education, and employment.
Finally, Part IV discusses potential criticisms. The measurement of
unconscious racism may be futile if doctrinally conscious awareness is an
element of "purposeful discrimination."
I.THE INTENT FRAMEWORK
A. Washington v. Davis and Its Progeny
The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis4 divided
anti-discrimination law into two terrains, intentional discrimination and
unintentional discrimination, deeming only the former to be subject to
strict scrutiny review. The Davis Court held that a facially race-neutral
policy or state action that carries a racially disproportionate impact vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that
he or she was the victim of intentional discrimination. The Davis plain-
tiffs were a group of Blacks who had been rejected for employment by
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department because they
had not passed the Department's written entrance examination (Test 21).
The unsuccessful Black applicants filed a class action challenging the
3. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
4. 426 U.S. 229.
5. Id. at 239.
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exam," because the test excluded four times as many Black applicants as
White applicants. 7 The plaintiffs did not claim intentional discrimination
on the part of the police department, but argued that Test 21's dispropor-
tionate impact on Black applicants violated both their statutory rights
under Title VII and their constitutional rights to equal protection under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.'
While the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in the district court, the court
of appeals applied Title VlI's disparate impact analysis to their equal pro-
tection claim and found Test 21's racially disproportionate impact
unconstitutional.' The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the
standard for adjudicating equal protection claims is not identical to the
standard used for Title VII claims. A plaintiff alleging a violation of the
equal protection clause could not succeed by showing disparate impact
alone.' Although the Davis Court acknowledged that Test 21 was not a
valid measure of job performance of potential governmental employees,
the Court found that the test served a legitimate governmental interest
because it measured verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension.
Therefore, its disproportionate effect on Blacks did not amount to invidi-
ous racial discrimination because the plaintiffs could not prove that the
Department had adopted the test with the specific intent of excluding
Blacks from the police force."
The Davis Court ruled that the "differentiating factor between de
jure segregation and so-called defacto segregation is purpose or intent to
segregate.' ' 12 The Court was careful to point out that its rule did not re-
quire that "the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or
appear on the face of the statute, or that a law's disproportionate impact is
irrelevant in cases involving Constitution-based claims of racial discrimi-
nation;"" yet, the Davis Court's shift to a motive-based review signaled
the end of any meaningful impact analysis under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Disparate impact on its own would no longer trigger strict scrutiny.
Justice White's majority opinion principally relied on the economic re-
percussions of judicial intervention in cases like Davis. He argued that a
6. Id. at 236.
7. Id. at 237. From 1968 to 1971, 57% of Blacks failed the test compared to 13% of
Whites.
8. Id. at 233.
9. Davis v. Washington, 512 E2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (applying the constitu-
tional standard as articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which held
that proof of discriminatory intent is unnecessary to satisfy a statutory violation when a
challenger can show disparate impact).
10. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238.
11. Id. at 246.
12. Keyes v. School District No. 1,413 U.S. 189,205 (1973).
13. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241.
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rule mandating strict scrutiny in all disparate impact cases "would be far
reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing stat-
utes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average Black
than to the more affluent White.""
One year after Davis, the Court provided further doctrinal clarifica-
tion of the purposeful discrimination standard in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing," holding that discriminatory motive was
required in all cases challenging facially neutral laws. In Arlington Heights, a
real estate corporation obtained an option to purchase a tract of land on
which it planned to develop a racially integrated low- and moderate-
income housing project.'6 The village refused to change the zoning of the
land from a single-family to a multi-family classification, and the corpora-
tion filed suit under the Fourteenth Amendment claiming that the
village's refusal was racially motivated." The Court found that policy
choices of legislatures or administrative bodies might be motivated by
several lawful concerns. However, it stated that the constitutional and so-
cial importance of racial discrimination demands that judicial deference
should cease, not when discriminatory purpose rested "solely on racially
discriminatory purpose," but when it had been shown to be "a motivating
factor.""' The Court went on to argue that discriminatory purpose "de-
mands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as may be available:"" The Arlington Heights Court offered several
evidentiary factors that could be used to infer intent: (1) the historical
background of the legislator's or administrator's decision; (2) the specific
sequence of events leading to the challenged decision; (3) legislative or
administrative history; and (4) the inevitability or foreseeability of the
law's consequences.The Court made clear that this list of evidentiary fac-
tors was not exhaustive.
In Arlington Heights, the Court reviewed several types of
circumstantial evidence: (1) the statements of the Planning Commission
and Village Board; (2) the minutes of the public meetings; and (3) the
disparate impact of the village's decision to maintain single-family zoning.
That decision disparately affected minorities who made up eighteen
percent of Chicago's population but forty percent of the income groups
that would have been eligible for the housing.2 The Court held that,
while some of the opponents "might have been motivated by opposition
14. Id. at 248.
15. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
16. Id. at 252.
17. id.
18. Id at 265-66.
19. Id. at 266.
20. 429 U.S. at 267-69.
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to minority groups ... [this] evidence '[did] not warrant the conclusion
that this [racial opposition] motivated the defendants.' "2
While the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights strengthened its
commitment to motive review for facially neutral challenges, the Court
also continued to make clear that disparate impact could provide evidence
that racial animus existed.-2 2 This "back road" to intent was closed in the
Court's 1979 decision in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.23 In Feeney all
applicants for official service jobs had to take a competitive entrance
exam.' The entrance examination as well as the candidate's previous
training and experience determined an applicant's final grade. However, a
state statute gave veterans an absolute preference for civil service jobs re-
gardless of how they scored on the entrance examination. Because over
ninety-eight percent of the veterans in the state were men, the preference
overwhelmingly disadvantaged women.2 ' The Court upheld the veteran
preference, finding that even though it was foreseeable to the legislature
that the preference would operate disproportionately to exclude women,
there had been no purposeful discrimination because "'discriminatory
purpose' .. . implies more than ... intent as awareness of consequences. It
implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its ad-
verse effects upon an identifiable group."' The Feeney Court's shift was
important because the holding focused on the proffered reasons for the
governmental action, not on whether the decision-maker was aware of
the foreseeable consequences of his or her decision.The Arlington Heights
Court found that it was sufficient for race to simply be a motivating fac-
tor, but the Feeney Court's focus on the actual reason implies that
discrimination must be the but-for cause of the decision.
2 7
The intent standard articulated in Davis and its progeny has seriously
diminished the capacity of plaintiffs to prove a violation under the Equal
Protection Clause because the subjective motivation of decision-makers
to disadvantage minorities or women is difficult to demonstrate. The
Arlington Heights factors enabled plaintiffs to use direct and circumstantial
21. Id. at 269 (quoting Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp v.Village of Arlington Heights, 373 E
Supp. 208,211 (N.D. Ill. 1974)0.
22. Reva Siegel, iy Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REmTV. 1111, 1133 (1997) (citing Grigqs v. Duke Power Co.,
which held that, under Title VI1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, evidence of disparate
impact alone could prove discrimination).
23. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
24. Id. at 263.
25. Id. at 270.When the legislation was enacted, only 1.8% of the veteran population
was women, while over one-fourth of the state's population had veteran status.
26. Id. at 279.
27. Justice Marshall in his dissent criticizes the Feeney majority for refining the Dais
intent standard into a primary motive or a but-for causation review Id. at 284.
[VOL. 8:395
"The hnplicit Association Test"
evidence to infer intent. One would have thought that this judicial
expansion of evidentiary mechanisms open to plaintiffs would have
unmasked laws that were the product of racism discrimination, but which
neither discriminated clearly on their face nor resulted from overt racism.
Unfortunately, the augmentation of evidentiary guidelines in ArlinLgton
Heights did not help plaintiffs prove their equal protection claims because
even if their claims successfully demonstrated the existence of procedural
irregularities or statistical disparities, some plaintiffs continued to run into
the formidable barrier of proving unconscious racism or prejudice.
A recent case highlights the difficulty of proving intent under the
Feeney standard. In United States v. Clary,2 a Missouri district court found
that unconscious racism had motivated the enactment of the crack co-
caine statutes. The court stated that "[r]acial influences which
unconsciously seeped into the legislative decision making process are no
less injurious, reprehensible, or unconstitutional."2' The court relied on the
factors announced in Arlington Heights to sustain the plaintiffs' equal pro-
tection challenge. The Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court's decision,
holding instead that the objective evidence offered by the plaintiffs dem-
onstrated only the disparate racial impact of the crack statutes and not
invidious intent on the part of Congress." The Eighth Circuit argued that
the lower court's reliance on unconscious racism "does not address the
question whether Congress acted with a discriminatory purpose."" The
lower court had inferred that the legislators' exposure to media stereo-
types of crack dealers had influenced their policy choice. Because at that
time it was nearly impossible for the plaintiffs to show that the media
stereotypes actually influenced the legislators' decision-making process,
the Eighth Circuit found that application of the Arlington Heights factors
could not establish proof of racial discrimination.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Davis and its progeny announced what
has amounted to a most limited equal protection principle.12 When
plaintiffs challenge a facially neutral law or policy, even if they can
demonstrate that the law or policy has a disproportionate impact on a
protected group, their claim must also be supported by proof of
purposeful discrimination. 31 If discriminatory purpose or motive can only
be shown by a "conscious behavioral intention to create social distance by
28. 846 F Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 34 F3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994).
29. Id. at 782.
30. Clary, 34 E3d at 712.
31. Id. at 713.
32. K.G. Jan Pillai, Shrinking Do,,ain of Invidious Intet, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
525, 529 (2001).
33. In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Court refined the
Davis standard, finding that discriminatory purpose "implies that the legislator selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of' not merely 'in spite of,'
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group" Id. at 272.
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denying out-group members certain benefits and opportunities," 34 under
the current equal protection framework, a decision-maker would either
have to admit to holding racial animus or leave a paper trial from which a
rational person could infer a discriminatory intent.
B. Unconscious Intent
Numerous constitutional scholars have criticized Davis and Feeney.
Many of these authors have critiqued the heavy burden a motive-centered
equal protection framework places on plaintiffs. Specifically, two ground-
breaking articles focus more directly on unconscious racism and status
discrimination and offer alternatives to the Davis intent framework. Pro-
fessor Charles Lawrence, in his seminal piece The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection, has argued that the Davis requirement of subjective intent
makes little sense because unconscious racial motivation influences most
behaviors that produce racially disparate results in law and policy.3 A re-
quirement of intent is ineffective because it does not take into account
"both the irrationality of racism and the profound effect that the history
of American race relations has had on the individual and collective un-
conscious.' ' 6 Professor Lawrence offers two schools of thought that
explain the origins and facilities of unconscious racism: cognitive psy-
chology and Freudian theory. 7  Cognitive psychologists argue that
individuals internalize prejudicial beliefs and preferences from their cul-
tural surroundings, including family, colleagues, and the media." Freudian
theorists further clarify the internalization of this prejudice: "the human
mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing
to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict with what the
individual has learned is good or right."3 Thus the mind, while actively
attempting to block out racist ideas, invariably lets them seep into the un-
conscious.
Lawrence proposes that courts consider the "cultural meaning" of an
alleged discriminatory act to determine whether racism operated in the
decision-making process.49 This new equal protection analysis would allow
plaintiffs to offer evidence that the governmental action "conveys a sym-
bolic message to which the culture attaches racial significance," namely a
34. Linda Hamilton Krieger, 77e Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,1176 (1995).
35. Charles R. Lawrence 1I, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning witi Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,321-22 (1987).
36. Id. at 323.
37. Id. at 322-23.
38. Lawrence, supra note 35 at 323.
39. Id. at 322-23.
40. Id. at 355-58.
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message that denigrates Blacks to inferior status.' For example, in the case
of Arlington Heights, this evidence would include "the history of statutorily
mandated housing segregation as well as the use of restrictive covenants
among private parties that aim to prevent [B]lacks from purchasing prop-
erty in [W]hite neighborhoods."
4 2
Professor Reva Siegel in her article, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Erforcing State Action, similarly criti-
cizes the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.43 She argues that, while
the Court's current doctrine is primed to handle obvious discriminatory
action, it is ineffective in combating status-based discrimination. The
Court's reluctance to strike down the state's use of" 'facially neutral' crite-
ria that have injurious effects on minorities or women" has led to the
impossible constitutional standard of discriminatory purpose, which is
defined as "tantamount to malice."" The Davis standard clearly turned the
tide in favor of motivational review and judicial deference."
Siegel argues that, while the Davis doctrine evinced a judicial prefer-
ence for a showing of discriminatory intent, it was not until the Court's
decision in Feeney that the Court made clear that plaintiffs would have to
show that legislators acted with express racial animus before strict scrutiny
would apply.16 This stringent standard protects most governmental actions
from successful equal protection challenges, thereby inviting "legislators to
act without regard to the foreseeable racial or gendered impact of their
actions;"47 and thus, "today doctrines of heightened scrutiny function
primarily to constrain legislatures from adopting policies designed to re-
duce race and gender stratification, while doctrines of discriminatory
purpose offer only weak constraints on the forms of facially neutral state
action that continue to perpetuate the racial and gender stratification of
41. Id. at 356.
42. Id. at 366.
43. Siegel, supra note 22.
44. Id. at 1113.
45. Most interestingly, Siegel finds that the emergence of the discriminatory purpose
doctrine was not a natural evolution but likely the result of an institutional competence
debate between judges and legal process scholars who contended that allowing successful
challenges to racially neutral practices based on impact alone was an unlawful encroach-
ment on legislative power. Id. at 1132-33. The Davis Court, in adopting the intent
doctrine, abandoned important precedents like Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225
(1971) (finding that the city's closing of certain municipal swimming pools did not consti-
tute a violation of equal protection despite allegations that the decision to close them was
motivated by a desire to avoid integration because the inquiry should focus "on the actual
effect of the enactments, not upon the motive which led the states to behave as they did");
and therefore, disagreed with the decisions of six courts of appeals and several district
courts that had held that disproportionate impact alone, without regard to intent, violates
the Equal Protection Clause.
46. Siegel, supra note 22, at 1134.
47. Id. at 1141.
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American society.'" ' While Professor Siegel does not fully advocate for the
outright abandonment of the Davis doctrine, she believes that courts
should not only focus on the mental state of decision-makers but should
also look to the racial and gender impact of their policies. To achieve this
goal, in circumstances in which policies further gender and racial subor-
dination, a Title VII disparate impact analysis should reign, and
government officials should actively justify their policies." Siegel states
that this framework would change the way we evaluate such policies and
encourage state actors to be more honest about the role they play in per-
petuating this stratification.
C. Institutional Competence and Measuring Unconscious Intent
As discussed above, the current intent standard is problematic. How-
ever, courts continue to adhere to the intent rule to avoid the slippery
slope consequences of applying an alternative standard. The IAT drives a
stake in that slope by providing a viable stopping point. The appeal of the
Davis framework for a conservative court lies in its promotion of legisla-
tive autonomy and curtailment of judicial power in areas that would
ostensibly lead to "too much justice."" Normatively, institutional factors
counsel against judicial interference in the province of legislative author-
ity unless there is compelling justification, such as when the legislature is
engaging in a clear pattern of racial discrimination.The Davis rule shields
the bureaucratic process from claims by systematically disadvantaged mi-
norities seeking review by the courts. The color-blind principle is
embedded in the argument for strict motivational review, which presumes
the neutrality of the decision-making criteria absent the clearest showing of
racial discrimination. s A strict mrotivational review, without more, insulates
race-conscious decision-making, as institutional competence concerns pre-
vail even when unconscious racism is clearly operating. As the district court
opinioned in Hopkins v Price Waterhouse,s" "it is impossible to accept the
view that Congress intended to have courts police every instance where
48. Id. at 1143.
49. Id. at 1144-45.
50. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,320-44 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting).The "too
much justice" concern refers to Justice White's majority opinion in Davis, which opined
that strict scrutiny in disparate impact cases would invalidate all race-neutral decisions that
disproportionately burdened minorities. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
51. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Nowv I See": White Race Consciousness and the Re-
quiremient qfDiscriminatory Intent, 91 MicH. L. REV. 953,983-85 (1993).
52. 615 ESupp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985).
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subjective judgment may be tainted by unarticulated, unconscious as-
sumptions related to sex.""
This Article argues that courts have remained steadfast to the intent
doctrine because courts believe that it is impossible to measure uncon-
scious racism. 4 The failure to endorse legal remediation of unconscious
racism arises at least in part from the Court's skepticism about whether
unconscious racism can actually be proved in a court of law. The Justices
on the Supreme Court seem to be aware of the elusive nature of dis-
crimination, because they continually acknowledge that discrimination is
not always subjectively purposeful and can be unconscious. 5 Justice
O'Connor, in her dissent in Georgia v. McColluin, argued in favor of per-
emptory challenges to secure minority representation on a jury because
"[i]t is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the
way White jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at
trials. " ' justice Ginsburg, in a dissent joined by Justice Souter in Adarand v.
Pena, stated that "[bjias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting tradi-
tional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must
come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genu-
inely to become this country's law and practice.""7 Even Justice Scalia,
after oral arguments in McClesky said,"[I]t is my view ... that the uncon-
scious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial,
upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowl-
edged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable. ..-s
Thus, members of the current Court acknowledge that unconscious
racism may motivate decision-makers. However, any refinement of the
Davis rule must also continue to be sensitive to the Court's legitimate
concerns for institutional competence and separation of powers.The pro-
posed rule must also be workable from an evidentiary perspective, in that
it must be able to quantitatively and qualitatively measure unconscious
racism. The Implicit Association Test may be such a measure. In theory the
53. Id. at 1118. (finding liability because "while the stereotyping by individual partners
may have been unconscious on their part, the maintenance of a system which gave weight
to such biased criticism was a conscious act on the partnership as a whole").
54. Barbara Flagg argues that courts may support the intent doctrine because they
believe that unconscious decision-making is rare or that racially conscious decisions should
be sanctioned more readily than unconscious discrimination. Flagg, supra note 51.
55. As the Court stated, "if [the law] applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrini-
nation between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justices is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356,373-74 (1886).
56. 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
57. 515 U.S. 200,274 (1995) (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
58. EDWARD LAZARUs, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS AccouNT OF THE
Epic STRUGGLE INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 211 (Geoff Shandler ed.,Times Books 1998)
(quoting untitled Scalia memorandum).
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IAT has the capacity to ferret out race-specific decision-making without
overstepping the Court's stringent evidentiary guidelines and Article III
concerns.
II.THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST
A. Description of the IAT
In 1997, Professor Mahzarin Banaji, Anthony G. Greenwald and their
colleagues at Yale and the University of Washington created an attitude
measurement test called the Implicit Association Test," which can measure
unconscious or implicit attitudes."0 Since its creation, the IAT has been
used to measure various implicit attitudes, including those pertaining to
sexuality, gender, and race."1 The goal of the Race IAT is to measure
automatic expressions of racial stereotypes and attitudes that test-takers
expressly and consciously disavow. 2 The IAT posits that scores will reveal
whether test-takers generally associate "good characteristics" more with
Whites than with Blacks.
One variation of the Race IAT works as follows: The test begins by
asking the test-taker two specific questions about her particular racial atti-
tudes and then basic demographic questions about her age, sex, and
residency.'3 After completing this survey, the computer-administered IAT
begins by introducing the test-taker to the two "target concepts" (White
versus Black) and two "attributes" (good versus bad). The test tells the
subject that they will be presented with pictures of unfamiliar Black and
White faces as well as words that describe "good" and "bad" characteris-
tics. For this particular test, the test-taker is told that the words used to
describe "good" are joy, love, peace, wonderful, pleasure, glorious, happy,
59. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 1464 (1998).
60. Dasgupta et al., Automnatic Preference for Mhite Anmericans: Eliinating the Familiarity Ex-
planation, 36 J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 316, 317 (2000), available at http://faculty.Washington.edu/
agg (last visited April 12, 2003)..
61. Studies have been done which show that the Race IAT predicts recommendations
for budget cuts for minority organizations, the gender stereotyping IAT predicted evalua-
tions of female job applicants, and the IAT measuring implicit attitudes towards gay men
predicted friendliness and non-verbal behaviors towards a gay male during a face-to-face
interaction.
62. Dasgupta et al., supra note 60.
63. The questionnaire asks the respondent the following two questions: (1) "Which
statement best describes you?" Answers include: "I strongly prefer Whites to Blacks, I mod-
erately prefer Whites to Blacks, I like Whites and Blacks equally, I moderately prefer blacks
to whites, I strongly prefer Blacks to Whites." (2) Rate "how warm or cold you feel toward
Blacks and Whites (0=coldest feelings, 5=neutral, 10= warm)." Imnplicit Association Test:
Black-1/bite IAT, at http://buster.cs.yale.edu/implicit/research/ProcessStdy.jsp.
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and laughter; and the words used to describe "bad" are agony, terrible,
horrible, nasty, evil, awful, failure, and war. 4 The test-taker is asked to keep
her index finger on the 'e' and 'i' key to enable the test-taker to respond
quickly.When the image or word that corresponds with the category on
the left-hand side of the screen appears she should press the 'e' key; alter-
natively if it corresponds to the right-hand side, the test-taker should press
the 'i' key.
Before each trial, the relevant categories appear at the top of the
right- and left-hand side of the screen. The Race IAT has six trials and
lasts ten minutes. For the first trial, the category "African American" ap-
pears on the left and "European American" appears oil the right-hand side
of the screen. When the first trial begins, a picture of a White or Black
face appears in the middle of the screen, and the test-taker is asked to clas-
sify the face with the correct category by pressing either the 'e' or 'i' key.
In the second trial, the category "Bad" appears on the left-hand side of
the screen and the category "Good" appears on the right.Words that de-
scribe either good or bad (Joy, nasty, war) appear in the middle of the
screen and the subject has to place them in the correct category by press-
ing the corresponding key. These first two trials do not mix words and
faces.
In the third trial, the categories "African American" and "Bad" are
placed together on the left-hand side of the screen and "European Ameri-
can" and "Good" are placed together on the right. In the middle of the
screen, the subject now sees a stream of faces and words, which she must
sort into the categories. The test-taker goes through this trial twice. The
fifth trial places the word "European American" on the right-hand side of
the screen and "African American" on the left and presents the test-taker
with pictures of Black and White faces.The sixth and seventh trials reverse
the pairings and place the categories of "European American" and "bad"
on the right-hand side of the screen and "African American" and "good"
on the right. Again, the test-taker is presented with pictures and words
that describe good and bad.
When the test-taker makes an error, a red X appears on the screen.A
test-taker's implicit attitude is measured by both her response time and
her error-rate. Thus, an attitude preference for Whites over Blacks is
displayed by a faster response time for White + good combinations
compared to the Black + good pairings.
The experiment contemplates that test-takers will have difficulty
during the sixth and seventh segment of the trials because most test-takers
will have more difficulty pairing good characteristics with the category
"Black." The IAT Corporation found that forty-eight percent of those
who take the Race IAT show a strong automatic preference for Whites,
64. See id.
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twelve percent show little or no preference, and six percent show a strong
preference for Blacks.'
The IAT demonstrates that single words can activate attitudes and
spontaneous trait inferences. Implicit attitudes are formed slowly and de-
velop by experience and social conditioning.66 Most decision-makers do
not intend to make policy choices to harm a stereotyped minority group.
Many times a decision-maker's biased attitude is beyond her own aware-
ness and arises and continues after her initial moment of decision. The
IAT makes test-takers aware of their implicit attitudes. This allows for a
"mental correction" because conscious self-awareness of automatic biases
creates the possibility for test-takers to control these biases in the future.
B. Benefits of Using the IAT
1. Unmasking Prejudice
The IAT can be used to unmask discriminatory intent by providing
evidence that a decision-maker holds a particular negative stereotype.
Studies using the IAT show that a test-taker can automatically activate
associations with ingrained stereotypes, which can affect subsequent social
and legal judgments." This finding contradicts current equal protection
jurisprudence, which assumes that decision-makers can accurately point
to why they are about to make or have made a particular policy choice. As
Richard Delgado argues, "the search for a culpable actor-one who is
malevolently motivated-reinforces a perpetrator perspective that sees
racism as a series of isolated actions and not an integrated system that ele-
vates one group at the expense of another.' If unconscious prejudice
operates, it is not subjected to self-correction in the marketplace of ideas
because stakeholders are not made aware of the legislators' beliefs.6' Cog-
nitive psychology confirms that well-intentioned decision-makers will
make mistakes and gives insight into how those errors may manifest
themselves."'
65. See IAT Black-White Debriefing Research, at http://buster.cs.yale.edu/irnplicit/
research/education/race/debriefing.jsp.
66. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Se!f-Estecm, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4-27 (1995).
67. See id. at 5.
68. Richard Delgado, 7vo Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and
Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2295 (2001).
69. Krieger, supra note 34, at 1216 n.248.
70. William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Stnicturing Lawmnaking to Reduce Cognitive
Bias:A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 616,646 (2002).
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Implicit social cognition uncovers "inaccessible effects of current
stimulus or prior experience variations on judgments and decisions.."
7'
Legislators and other policymakers may make decisions that they them-
selves would label non-optimal if they were made aware of the
unconscious source of their behavior.12 The effects of unconscious preju-
dice will likely be important in decisions that distribute scarce goods such
as jobs and school admissions. A large number of decisions made by the
state that have a racially disparate impact do not result from discrimina-
tory motivation but from a variety of unintentional judgments, and thus,
the Court's current understanding of bias is not complete because it is
limited to a motivational analysis that relies on a misunderstanding about
discriminators' state of mind. A legislator can only refrain from discrimi-
nating if she is self-aware, that is if she can identify accurately the factors
leading to her policy choice. 3
Another problem with the intent requirement is that for decisions of
multi-member bodies it is hard to discern whose attitudes and feelings
must be proved. The intent doctrine allows a decision-maker to mask his
or her prejudiced beliefs behind fabricated motivations that are proper.
For example, even though the Arlington Heights Court acknowledged that
the opponents of re-zoning might have been motivated by racial preju-
dice, the court stated that "this circumstantial evidence [did] not warrant
the conclusion that [racial prejudice] motivated the defendants ... [be-
cause] the weight of the evidence proves that the defendants were
motivated ... by a legitimate desire to protect property values.".. -" This
"atomistic approach" allows defendants to avoid liability using pretexts
and false motivations to conceal their true and improper purpose.
Evidence garnered from survey research suggests that the vast major-
ity of individuals who have low prejudice ratings realize that their actual
reactions to members of stereotyped groups conflict with their personal
sentiments of how they think they would respond." The IAT unmasks
this prejudice by bringing the actual race specificity of a decision to the
surface, thereby allowing for future race-neutral decision making.
2. Prejudice Reduction
The IAT seeks to serve a remedial function. Studies show that the
IAT test-taker's prejudices can actually be reduced once an individual is
71. Krieger, supra note 34, at 1190.
72. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Preju-
dice Habit, 83 CAl. L. REv. 733,757 (1995).
73. Timothy D.Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
Umnvanted Influences onJdgimennts and Evaluation, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1994).
74. 373 ESupp. 208,211 (N.D. 111. 1974).
75. Armour, supra note 72, at 740-742.
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confronted with his unconscious prejudices.' Social science evidence
shows that increased consciousness of race will decrease discrimination.
Once individuals take the IAT and get their results, they can then stop
and ask whether thoughtless adherence to racial stereotypes is affecting
their decisions. If so, decision-makers can take remedial measures to pre-
vent or diminish unconscious use of race-specific criteria."7
Cognitive psychology teaches us that when individuals are presented
with a claim-such as "all crack users are black"--they give some initial
import to the hypothesis and will then search for evidence to support the
claim. 8 Once they have begun to start treating it as a tentative theory,
they will view evidence that supports their theory as more probative than
evidence that disconfirms it." Theorists argue that this bias can be re-
duced through correction during the decision-making process.
Bias reduction among decision-makers is feasible. Studies have
shown that an individual's IAT scores can be manipulated by experimen-
tal design. For example, studies have shown that when test-takers were
exposed to "admirable" African Americans, they were less likely to express
their racist attitudes.8" Studies have also shown that subjects asked to
imagine a powerful woman before taking the IAT were less likely to asso-
ciate men with strength."
In the legal arena, the results of a particular decision-maker's IAT can
be used to encourage her to stimulate her non-prejudicial beliefs in her
next decision, thereby reducing future discriminatory judgments about
members of stereotyped groups.82 Assuming that most decision-makers
espouse racial equality, they will not consciously recognize their hidden
prejudices even if their decisions have adverse consequences for Blacks or
other minorities. However, if their responses are monitored by the IAT,
they are more likely to scrutinize their attitudes and policy choices be-
cause any semblance of discriminatory intent would undermine their
egalitarian self-identification. "[U]nless a low-prejudiced person con-
76. Greenwald et al., A Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem, &
Se!f-Concept, 109 PsYcHoj_. RV. 1,9-18 (2002).
77. Krieger, supra note 34, at 1217.
78. Clem Turner, 4hat's the Story? An Analysis qf Juror Discrimnination and a Plea for Af-
firmative Jury Selection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 289, 293-97 (1996).
79. Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Mhose Motive Matters? Dis-
crintination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REv. 495, 525-26 (2001).
80. Greenwald et al., supra note 76, at 3-25 (2002).
81. Id.
82. Armour may label the IAT as means of furthering her dissociation model. The
dissociation model "points to the possibility of inhibiting and replacing stereotype-
congruent responses with nonprejudiced responses derived from nonprejudiced personal
beliefs. If nonprejudiced personal beliefs can counteract stereotypes in this way, perhaps
there is hope for combatting the influence of ubiquitous derogatory stereotypes." Armour,
supra note 72, at 744.
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sciously monitors and inhibits the activation of a stereotype in the pres-
ence of a member (or symbolic equivalent) of a stereotyped group, she
may unintentionally fall into the discrimination habit."
8 3
Thus the IAT can serve as both a reminder of decision-makers' un-
conscious discrimination habits and of their articulated personal racial
beliefs. By knowing that their discrimination habit is subject to challenge
by a plaintiff's attorney, decision-makers are likely to monitor their deci-
sions more assiduously than if they knew that their decisions would
almost always pass muster under the Davis intent standard. Further, if the
IAT were used early in the decision-making process, it could encourage
decision-makers to seek disconfirming evidence and to subject their cur-
rent pool of information to the highest level of scrutiny. The IAT also
encourages community groups to monitor the legislative process and pre-
vent prohibited factors, assumptions, and stereotypes from affecting the
judgments of decision-makers.
3. Reconsideration ofTesting
At its core, the IAT is a scientific test that has been shown to meas-
ure objectively a test-taker's unconscious attitudes and prejudices.The IAT
could evaluate a particular legislator's action and see whether this decision
was the result of latent prejudice. In this sense the IAT is just as appealing
as other "objective tests," such as the LSAT or Test 21-the test adminis-
tered in Davis-because it is easy to administer and has the capacity to be
objective and facially devoid of color and gender bias.
Even judges who may be skeptical of tests hold a dual consciousness
regarding the efficacy of testing even when the tests have negative racial
and gender effects. On one hand, judges may believe that tests are good
because they distribute benefits based on the abilities and achievements of
the particular candidate rather than on race, socio-economic position, or
gender. Additionally, decision-makers may think that tests have the possi-
bility of being objective, in that some quality can be quantified without
regard to those characteristics. The belief that tests can be neutral and ac-
curate prevents us from acknowledging that we continue to privilege
devices that can spit out numbers quickly because we somehow believe
that the readiness of the test makes them color-blind. By failing to con-
duct a formal inquiry into the efficacy of the test at hand, the triumph of
"the measurable" reigns even when the existing selection method does
not actually result in hiring or admitting more capable workers or stu-
dents. For example, the Court in Davis acknowledged thatTest 21 actually
had a tenuous relationship with the ability to perform skills required by
police officers on the beat. 4 By upholding tests like Test 21 and allowing
83. Id. at 757.
84. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,237 (1976).
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employers to make entrance decisions based on test performance that is
unrelated to job performance, the Supreme Court has validated a testing
regime that prefers tests that are easy to administer rather than ones that
substantively measure the criteria the decision-maker is trying to deter-
mine.
If we are going to continue to privilege "one-size-fits all" tests be-
cause they are easy to administer and race-neutral, we should also similarly
privilege the IAT. The IAT is available to millions of Americans and can
be taken on the Internet. It is minimally intrusive and only takes ten min-
utes to complete.Various socio-economic and racial groups have used it in
classrooms and as employment criteria, and it is likely to be cost-effective.
If the IAT makes it possible to reduce an individual's degree of prejudice
to a unitary measure, then we should promote it as we do any other test,
because it objectively uncovers socially useful information, namely the
race-specificity of a decision-maker's decision.
Courts may be skeptical about the evidentiary value of the IAT as a
means to measure intent. Some critics have argued that the definition of
intent is unclear because the Court, instead of defining what acts consti-
tute discrimination, has instead offered guidelines regarding what types of
proof will evince purposeful discrimination." In order for strict scrutiny
review to apply, a plaintiff has to show that a reasonable inference of dis-
crimination can be made. As Linda Krieger and others have argued, the
key question of whether race affected the decision-making process is a
question about causation rather than the subjective state of mind.16 "A
causation driven inquiry would not focus on whether the decision-maker
is aware that he was basing his decision on race, but on whether the plain-
tiff's race in fact caused the decision to be made."87 Thus, a potential
criticism of the IAT is a performance-based one: Is the IAT a good evi-
dentiary tool to infer racial discrimination? Courts might fear that
reliance on an unconventional theory to discern unconscious intent
would diminish the probative value of the evidence.
Of the IAT, courts may ask: Can you manipulate its results? Is the test
statistically significant? Can a ten-minute test really capture the delibera-
tive process a decision-maker goes through when formulating a policy? Is
cognitive theory a sound methodology? What do other experts in the
field think about the scientific desirability of the IAT? What is the pro-
spective stability of the IAT? An extensive discussion of the answers to
these questions is beyond the scope of this article. Unequivocal empirical
evidence is not necessary to make the case that measurement of uncon-
85. Michael Selini, Proving lentitoal Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEo. L.J. 279, 283 (1997).
86. White & Krieger, supra note 79, at 498.
87. Id. at 510.
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scious intent is essential and that a means of measuring intent may be psy-
chological testing.
In addition, this article posits that the IAT should be used in con-
junction with the evidentiary tools listed in Arlington Heights. When a
particular policy has racially disparate effects even though the statute is
neutral on its face, the test results of a particular decision-maker that
shows that he is racially prejudiced allows a court to make the reasonable
inference that he acted "because of" race. Part II of this Article will dis-
cuss in greater detail how courts could use the results of a legislator's IAT
with the other Arlington Heights factors such as historical background, a
specific sequence of events, and departures from normal procedures to
evince a showing of purposeful discrimination.
III.THE IAT IN THE DAVis FRAMEWORK AND
OTHER POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS
The problem with the existing equal protection doctrine is that it is
incapable of rooting out racial discrimination where it is the most perni-
cious. The IAT can refine the Davis intent standard to help courts
accurately identify what facially neutral challenges are deserving of strict
scrutiny review. This Part, besides using the IAT as an additional eviden-
tiary factor in the Davis framework, also proposes several other ways the
IAT can be implemented in both the legal and educational context. The
IAT can be used to help screen jurors out of the venire who may have
unarticulated racial biases.The injustice of the intent rule is not confined
to non-criminal cases, but has shielded the entire judicial system from its
responsibility to identify jurors whose racial animus continues to create
systematic disadvantage for certain defendants.The IAT could also be used
to supplement ability measurement tests in areas of work in which race-
neutrality highly correlates with successful job performance. Finally, the
IAT could simply be used as an educational tool in classrooms around the
nation. Many teachers have already used the IAT to challenge students'
existing assumptions about their own racial attitudes.
A. The IAT and the Davis Standard.
This Article does not argue that courts should abandon the Davis
framework. It does not advocate for a constitutional rule that employs
strict scrutiny to all cases that have disparate effects. Instead it offers an
alternative rule that is a workable refinement of the Davis intent standard:
The IAT (or psychological testing more generally) should be added to tile non-
exclusive list enumerated in Arlington Heights for determining racial intent. This
limited use of the IAT would still allow the "central purpose of the [Equal
Protection Clause to be] the prevention of official conduct discriminating
SPRING 2003]
MichiganJournal of Race & Law
on the basis of race.""8 Yet this proposal would make the intent standard
more meaningful and create the possibility for an equal protection regime
that, not only in theory but also in practice, prevents race-dependent gov-
ernmental decision-making from eluding equal protection scrutiny.
Current equal protection jurisprudence gives courts the power to
rectify only those laws that clearly discriminate on their face or acts that
are the result of overt racism.89 Most legislation does not contain overtly
racist language. A strict application of the Davis rule, essentially an opaque
articulation of how decision-makers deliberate, creates an impossible stan-
dard of proof for plaintiffs, because in most cases the challengers cannot
detect or quantify the invidious intent of legislators who vote on a par-
ticular proposal, especially when the law is neutral on its face."'
Additionally, because most decisions involve multi-member decision-
making bodies, discerning a "group's mental state of mind" can be even
more difficult."'
However, the evidentiary factors articulated by the Court in Arling-
ton Heights may enable a plaintiff's attorney who is challenging a
particular state action to use the IAT to prove negative racial stereotyping
or attitudes in the legislative decision making process .1 2 Because courts
have decided to scrutinize the mental state of government decision-
makers rather than the impact of their policies on minorities, the IAT
should be used to discern their actual motive.
The Arlington Heights factors create several places that the IAT could
be used. First, under the Arlington Heights factors, a legislator could be
asked to testify on the stand."3 Therefore, a plaintiff who is challenging a
facially neutral statute that has a disparate effect could possibly subject the
legislator to the IAT to show that racial animus could have affected her
decision.The IAT results for a particular legislator would not assume that
the legislator made a policy choice because of racial animus, but that race
may have unconsciously affected what policy she chose, how she inter-
preted the benefits or costs of that policy, or what value she attributed to
the community concerns. Under Arlington Heights, courts could also com-
88. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
89. E.g., David Kairys, Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race, 45 AM. U. L. REv.
729,731-32 (1996).
90. As Professor Fiss has argued, Davis'"state of mind" requirement adds "psychologi-
cal gloss" and creates a threshold of proof that is difficult to meet. See Owen Fiss, A Theory
qf Fair Employneiit Laws, 38 U. CI. L. REv. 235, 297 (1971).
91. See e.g., Note, The Intent Requirement at the Crossroads: Racial Discrimination and City
of Memphis v. Greene, 34 BAYLOR L. REv. 309 (1982).
92. Villa. ofArlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.Auth., 429 U.S. 252,265 (1977).
93. Id. at 268 ("In some extraordinary instances the members might be called to the
stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although even then
such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege.").
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pare a legislator's IAT results with contemporaneous statements made by
the legislator during the decision-making process. 4 The potential dispar-
ity between legislators' statements and their IAT results could buttress a
plaintiff's claim of discriminatory intent.
This Article sets out a matrix of four discrete categories of pre-
scrutiny analysis useful for understanding the Court's demanding standard
for identifying acts of intentional discrimination in facially neutral statutes
that violate the Equal Protection Clause.The strength of the direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence offered by the plaintiff will determine in which
category her claim is placed. After Feeney, a decision-maker must have
selected a particular policy at least in part "because of" not merely "in




Because of Race Category I Category III
In Spite of Race Category II Category IV
In Category I, the decision maker consciously chooses to enact a
policy because of the group's race, sex, gender, and so forth. Here, the de-
fendants must have left a clear paper trail demonstrating that even though
the statute is facially neutral, the express purpose of the statute was to in-
jure the protected group. Some limited cases, such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in
which the pattern of denying Chinese applicants laundry licenses was
tantamount to explicit exclusion, so that no rational explanation other
than race could be deduced, are also placed in this box. 6 Existing equal
protection doctrine will apply strict scrutiny to these decisions. Category
1I cases occur when the decision-maker is consciously aware of the ad-
verse consequences on a protected group." However, courts will not
overturn these laws even though the effects of the policy on minorities or
women were foreseeable at the time the legislature chose to act.The Davis
framework provides no remedy unless the record shows that the decision-
maker devised this policy with the goal of discriminating against women
or people of color.'" A court would classify these decisions as non-race
dependent because they were not enacted with the clear design to disad-
vantage a protected group.
94. See id. at 268.
95. Pers. Darn's of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,277-78 (1979).
96. 118 U.S. 356,373 (1886)
97. An example of a case in this category is Feeney.
98. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
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Current equal protection doctrine does not remedy the cases that
fall into Category II. Here, while the actor's decision to enact a race-
dependent policy was "because of race," this intent is unconscious. Under
the existing evidentiary tools available to plaintiffs under Arlington Heights,
unconscious prejudice will legally be "undetected" by the Court. Cate-
gory IV cases are more difficult to imagine and might simply be a null set
under this framework.
The IAT can be used to remedy the impediments created by the in-
tent requirement for Category III cases. This will minimally expand the
number of cases that receive strict scrutiny, compared to the alternative
rejected by the Davis Court that would have also remedied cases that fell
into Category II and perhaps even Category IV Currently, only Category
I claims are remedied; this has had the practical effect of protecting most
race-dependent decision-making embodied in facially neutral statutes.
Because purposeful discrimination is socially shamed and politically rep-
rehensible, more often than not, there will be no testimony or direct
statements that will provide the basis of evidentiary support presently re-
quired for Category I cases. Employing the IAT only in Category III cases
does not lead to a wholesale judicial intrusion into the legislative and po-
litical processes, as would a general moratorium on discriminatory intent,
which would create the "too much justice" problem. By identifying only
those cases in which race unconsciously influences the decisions of legis-
lators, the IAT leaves intact non-race dependent laws that
disproportionately burden minority groups. This allows the courts to
strike an appropriate balance between legislative autonomy and judicial
oversight, giving each interest due deference without doing violence to
the other.
Category Ill cases deserve protection because the primary focus of
the equal protection doctrine is to prohibit official racial discrimination,
including the acts of sophisticated governmental officials who can readily
conceal their discriminatory prejudice." It is one thing to immunize
broad facially-neutral policies that happen to have some negative effect on
a particular racial group, such as Category II and Category IV cases, from
judicial oversight; however, it is quite another scenario when courts legally
ratify policies that were enacted because of racial bias, simply because the
decision-maker did not consciously intend for his decision to be based on
race. Additionally, allowing plaintiffs to offer the subconscious intent of
legislators as circumstantial evidence of purposeful discrimination simply
opens the door to further scrutiny. These claims will only pass muster if
the government cannot show it had a compelling interest in enacting
such a law.
99. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How
Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151,1154 (1991).
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Using the IAT in Category III cases would invalidate the dual equal-
ity regime that exists in equal protection law. When a race-conscious
statute is passed that is enacted to remedy past discrimination, courts gen-
erally strike it down, turning a blind eye toward institutional competence
concerns. But when there is a facially neutral statute that harms minori-
ties, the courts defer to the legislature and apply moral skepticism toward
any claim that the decision-makers intended to discriminate.""
Thus, if the IAT can objectively discern that racial animus or race
considerations played a motivating role, these cases should similarly be
entitled to the same amount of judicial activism and moral repudiation
that race-specific programs and policies receive. IAT results serve as an
appropriate barometer for racial discrimination, highlighting the presence
and degree of unconscious intent, which ostensibly should signal to a
court that the state action is akin to an explicit racial classification. Again,
this still limits the range of cases that receive judicial review because once
purposeful discrimination is determined, a court still engages in a strict-
scrutiny analysis to determine whether the policy is narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental interest.
Use of the IAT to determine intent also allows plaintiffs to discern
the weight of racial animus in decisions made by multi-member legislative
bodies. Most decisions in the state and federal legislative process are a
product of committee deliberations in which some persons within the
group may consciously act out of racial animus, some may unconsciously
do so, and others may neither consciously or subconsciously factor race
into their decision. Therefore, the intent standard as it exists leaves intact
many race-dependent decisions made by deliberative bodies because as
critics have argued, "[g]roups do not have mental states, and while indi-
vidual members of groups might be shown to possess particular mental
states, there is no reason to attribute the motive of any particular individ-
ual to the group as a whole."'
Prior to Davis, the Court looked at legislative motive with a wary
eye because of the problems implicit in any judicial examination of intent
of multi-member bodies."2 In a 1960s case, United States v. O'Brien, the
Court argued that legislative motivation should play a limited role in the
constitutional inquiry because not only is it hard to discern what a large
number of legislators acted on, but relying on a few comments concern-
ing the statute does not indicate motive."3 As the Court stated, "[w]hat
100. Flagg, supra note 51.
101. White & Krieger, supra note 79, at 530 (quoting Evan Ten Lee & Shuts Bawd, The
McClesky Puzzle: Retnedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital
Scntengcit, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145,154)..
102. See Palmer v.Thomnpson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
103. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,383 (1968).
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motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily
what motivates scores of others to enact it."" 4
While by the time of the Davis decision, the Court was less antago-
nistic about the efficacy of motive-based review, the O'Brien critique has
had the effect of leaving race-conscious policies intact because proving
the mental state of groups has been onerous.The IAT could deal with the
O'Brien concerns by determining the conscious intent of each decision-
maker and then aggregating the results."'" Depending on the decision rule
of the particular committee, a claim would exist only if a majority or
two-thirds of the voting members unconsciously took the protected char-
acteristic into account.
Further, there is powerful social science evidence that people's own
perceptions about a policy can be influenced by the behavior of others in
the group."" Use of the IAT as circumstantial evidence regarding the
group decision-making process will inform the court of the degree race
played in the decision and how various factors may have influenced the
decision-making body to make a race-dependent decision. Additionally, it
prevents the court from also making the unsubstantiated assumption that
the presence of minorities or women on the committee automatically
offsets any chance that racial or gender animus could have driven the de-
cision.
The IAT makes it possible to discern the "collective" intent of deci-
sion-making bodies when a decision is a result of a group process. This
will allow plaintiffs to determine whether the decision was the collective
product of discrimination and whether a prejudiced agent could have
played a role in the decision-making process. In this way, the IAT could be
used both as an evidentiary tool to show intent and also as a corrective
device. Legislators who make decisions in multi-member bodies would be
encouraged to check their prejudice rating before and after deliberations
to determine whether prejudice played a role in the outcome of their
vote.
B. Other Applications
1 .The IAT-and the Jury Venire
The Court in Turner v. Murray acknowledged that racial attitudes
might play a dangerous role in a capital case when the defendant is Black
104. Id. at 384.
105. Id. at 384-85.
106. White & Krieger, supra note 79, at 535.
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and the victim is White.'"7 Thus, in 7urner, the Court ruled that "a capital
defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective
-jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of
racial bias."""' There is a vast body of psychological and opinion poll evi-
dence that supports the claim that White jurors are more likely to bring
racial stereotypes and other cultural baggage into the courtroom.""
Jury selection comprises of three distinct stages.'"' First, there is a
random gathering and then narrowing of those in the conmmunity who
are generally eligible for jury service. This pool is called the jury venire.
The jury members in the venire then may be excused by a showing of
undue hardship or extreme inconvenience. After this group is narrowed,
the remaining potential jurors are subject to voir dire. After Tinter, attor-
neys may in this last stage ask eligible jurors in the venire about their
racial attitudes and beliefs."' This usually involves the judge or the defense
attorney asking the prospective juror if she or he has any racial bias. Social
cognition theorists would argue that the search for the "ideal impartial
juror" is futile because jurors may not be aware of the biases that affect
their judgments.' 2 Thus, the unconscious nature ofjuror bias prevents the
voir dire from impaneling fair and impartial jurors, and methods, such as
direct questioning, may be fruitless unless questions are designed to tap
into one's source of bias."'
The IAT may be one means to highlight a juror's pre-existing biases.
Use of the IAT can help eradicate discrimination and ensure the integrity
of a fair trial by preventing the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments from
107. Turner v Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); see also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451
U.S. 182, 189 (1981) (citing Ham v. S.C., 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (holding that questions of
racial bias are necessary during voir dire only when "racial issues [are] inextricably bound
up with the conduct of the trial")); Hernandez v. State, 742 A.2d 952 (Md. 1999) (holding
that the defendant has a right to ask prospective jurors specifically about their racial bias
even if the crime had no racial overtones). But f Spencer v. Murray, 18 E3d 229,234 n.6
(4th Cit. 1994) (holding that the failure of defendant's counsel to inquire about the racial
attitudes of prospective jurors did not satisfy an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
108. Ttier, 476 U.S. at 36-37.
109. William Bowers et al., Death Sentenciti in Black and Wiite:An Eiipirical Analysis of
the Role ofJurors'Race andJur)' Racial Coiiposition, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 171,179-80 (2001).
110. Comment, Th1e Cross-Section Requirenment and Jury !nipartiality, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1555
(1985).
111. Turner, 476 US. at 36-37.
112. See Krieger, supra note 34, at 1188 (arguing that "stereotypes, when they function
as implicit prototypes or schemas, operate beyond the reach of the decisionmaker self-
awareness").
113. Justice Marshall in his concurring decision in Batson v Kentucky explained the
potency of unconscious racism by jurors: "A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious
racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or
'distant,' a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a hite juror had acted
identically.A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an
explanation as well supported." 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986).
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remaining impervious to challenges alleging systematic discrimination in
criminal law. Even experienced attorneys who have had years of court-
room experience may not possess tools that can readily determine the
racial attitudes and beliefs of eligible jurors. The IAT could be a useful
tool to ferret out intentional discrimination that is hidden under a cloak
of neutral rationalizations.
2.The IAT as a Test ofJob Performance
The IAT may be better at producing observable data related to criti-
cal job behaviors. Most citizens would agree that we would like our
police officers or teachers to employ non-discriminatory behaviors. Let us
accept for a moment that a low-prejudiced decision-maker is able to form
better relationships with community members and is less likely to violate
a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights. Assuming that the IAT can accu-
rately measure the racial attitudes of a police officer, an officer's IAT
results will demonstrate future success in making policing decisions that
benefit all of the citizens he or she is supposed to protect. Unlike the Dis-
trict of Columbia's Test 21, the results of the IAT and the inferences that are
formed from the IAT-the degree of racial prejudice held by the candi-
date-have a symmetrical relationship with the relevant job characteristic.
3. The IAT as an Educational Tool
Even if the IAT is not implemented in a court of law it could still be
used as a remedial tool in educational settings. Society should not want to
encourage people to remain ignorant of their own prejudicial beliefs. Un-
thinking racial prejudice sharpens social awareness of all kinds of
discrimination. Several universities such as Harvard,Yale, and University of
North Carolina, use the IAT as an educational tool to instruct students
about racism.While the law is imperfect at rooting out racial discrimina-
tion, citizen education should continue to take place in America's
classrooms so that the racial divide has a possibility of being broken down.
IV POTENTIAL CRITICISMS
A. Unconscious Attitudes Are Not an Element of Intent
Legal acceptance of the IAT will depend on the definition of inten-
tional discrimination. The Feeney Court stated that "discriminatory
purpose ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
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consequences.""' The Court's definition reaffirms prior decisions holding
that purpose is more than simply making a policy choice knowing the
racial or gender consequences of that decision.The Feeney definition gives
no clear guidance about whether a plaintiff must show malice or animus;
nor does it clearly imply that the actor must consciously be aware that he
or she is engaging in discrimination when selecting a particular course of
action. Later decisions by the Court have not clearly defined the defini-
tion and elements of "discriminatory purpose" and have used
"discriminatory intent," "purposeful discrimination," and "invidious dis-
crimination" interchangeably"' Attempting to clarify this ambiguity, Don
Welch argues that:
"intent is prospective while motive is retrospective. Motive
addresses the factors that lead into a decision: the reasons
upon which a decision is based, the realities that motivate
the decisionmaker. Intent is synonymous with purpose. It
speaks to the goals toward which the actor moves, the ends
the actor aims to achieve. One's motive can be conscious or
unconscious; an actor may or may not be aware of the
causes of a particular action. Intent is conscious-a deci-
sionmaker knows what he or she intends.' 1 6
If intent and not motive as defined above is the constitutional stan-
dard, then proof of unconscious racism is irrelevant to the due process
inquiry. Why might conscious intent be the standard? Barbara Flagg argues
that implicit in the intent rule is the presumption that "conscious use of
race-specific criteria is more blameworthy than the unconscious use of
race.' ' 17 This line of argument is consistent with other areas of common
law and criminal law that punish acts that are intentionally or knowingly
performed more severely than ones that are inadvertent. Supporters of the
current framework argue that the nature of the constitutional injury is
different when citizens are aware of the legislator's improper motive than
when there is simply an unconstitutional effect."'
However, remedying unconscious racism is consistent with existing
equal protection law and encourages public confidence in decision-
makers. Until the Court's decision in Adarand, it was clear that "invidious
purpose must be adduced to support a claim of unconstitutionality."' But
114. Pers. Adrn'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (citing United Jewish Orgs. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (concurring opinion)) (1979).
115. Pillai,supra note 32, at 531.
116. P. Don Welch, Removitng Discriminatory Barriers: Basin Disparate Treatment Analysis ot
Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. IEV. 733,736 (1987).
117. Flagg, supra note 54, at 985.
118. Scott W Breedlove &Victoria S. Salzmann, Pie Devil Made Me Do It:The Irrelevance
of Legislative Motivation Under the Establishment Clause, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 419,428 (2001).
119. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 63 n.10 (1980).
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in Shatv v. Reno the Court made clear that a "racial classification, regardless
of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only
upon extraordinary justification.'" 2 In Adarand, Justice O'Connor stated
that the Court would apply strict scrutiny to governmental actions that
explicitly use racial classifications.' 2' Doctrinally, it is not clear why this
skepticism should not extend to non-explicit measures that disadvantage
minorities. As the Adarand Court states, "the point of strict scrutiny is to
"differentiate between permissible and impermissible governmental use of
race.'22 If the Court no longer differentiates between "invidious" and
"benign" racial discrimination, it similarly should not distinguish between
"conscious" and "unconscious" intent, especially if unconscious intent can
be measured. Justice Thomas should take the same uncompromising posi-
tion as he did in Adarand, that "good intentions cannot provide refuge
from the principle that under our Constitution, the government may not
make distinctions on the basis of race.""'1 If the government's good inten-
tions cannot protect its benign racial classifications, then their embedded
bad intentions should not protect racial decisions that may be invidious. If
we are going to apply skeptical scrutiny to benign classifications, why
should the Court then distinguish between active and passive forms of
race-based classifications if the transparency of decision-makers actions
can be uncovered?" 24 Further, as a normative matter, to leave unconscious
discrimination untouched is to legitimate patterns of behavior that should
not be sanctioned by the courts.
CONCLUSION
The Court's acknowledgement of unconscious racism demonstrates
that the Court may not have a varying vision of what acts constitute dis-
crimination; rather, the Court's jurisprudence is guided by the Justices'
normative conclusion that unconscious racism simply cannot be meas-
ured. Therefore, this Article proposes a minimal revision of the current
Davis intent framework. Plaintiffs should be able to use the Implicit Asso-
ciation Test as circumstantial evidence within the Arlington Heights factors
to demonstrate that the challenged practice was not constitutionally justi-
fied and relief is warranted because of unconscious prejudice on the part
of the decision-maker.This rule would not trigger the Court's "too much
120. 509 U.S. 630, 643-44 (1993) (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
272 (1979)).
121. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
122. Id. at 228.
123. Id. at 240 (ThomasJ., concurring).
124. Siegel, supra note 22, at 1145.
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justice" concern, because it would leave in tact race-neutral decision-
making that had a disparate impact on a cognizable minority.
The Court's restricted notion of intentional discrimination is futile
because most decision-makers are not cognizant that they even took race
into account. However, if the use of race is the criterion for establishing a
constitutional harm, then unconscious race-specific decisions should simi-
larly receive heightened review. Allowing plaintiffs or lawyers to use the
IAT would not interfere with majoritarian decisions but would illuminate
when discrimination unconstitutionally infected the decision-making
process. While it is doubtful that courts could be persuaded to use the
IAT as circumstantial evidence to infer intent, engaging in this thought
experiment demonstrates that if unconscious discrimination could be
measured, the Davis intent rule is an ineffective means of implementing
the Constitution's prohibition against racial discrimination.

